Michael Smirkonish recently argued on Hardball that it is acceptable to torture someone to prevent an attack if the threat of attack is imminent. The argument, however, is inherently contradictory. That a threat is imminent necessarily implies that one is aware of an oncoming attack; and one can only be sure that a threat is imminent if and only if there is clear and direct evidence that an attack is pending. Hamas launching missiles into Israel on a frequent basis is clear and direct evidence that further attacks from Hamas are not only probably but are likely. Hamas, therefore, poses an imminent threat. On the other hand, North Korea a couple years ago launched a Taepodong II missile that, in theory, was capable of reaching California. There was significant evidence that North Korea fully intended to launch the missile, but there was no clear or direct evidence suggesting that they intended to use it against the U.S. or its allies. What, then, amounts to clear and direct evidence that an attack is imminent? First, if one cannot answer that, one cannot determine precisely under what circumstance it is acceptable to torture another human being. Also, speculating that an attack is possible, or even probable, does not amount to clear and direct evidence that an attack is likely. Speculation or circumstantial evidence, therefore, are not adequate means by which to measure the likelihood of an attack. Finally, that there is evidence that is clear and direct must mean that the agencies whose task it is to gather such evidence already know who is going to attack, what those people intend to do, when they will do it, how they will do it, and why they will do it. Clearly, then, it is an absurd contradiction to say that there is both an imminent threat of attack and a need to torture someone to prevent such an attack, since the need to torture necessarily implies that there is a critical intelligence gap that cannot possibly allow for one to determine that a threat is imminent.