Why the Department of Defense Has Rushed Troops Back Into Baghdad

Julian E. Barnes writes, “Fifteen years ago, Pentagon doctrine suggested there was a strict division between combat operations and peacekeeping, or stability, missions….” (43) According to Barnes, retired Colonel Clint Ancker studies warfare for the Department of Defense and writes field manuals full of lessons learned. “The Army’s experience in Kosovo, Bosnia, and, especially, Somalia, Ancker says, proved that during humanitarian operations designed to stabilize a country, there was still a need for military muscle. But Ancker argues that the Iraq invasion showed that the Army did not grasp the flip side of the Bosnia lesson, that during combat operations there was a need for peacekeeping-style activities….Embedded in the new doctrine is an implicit critique of how the Iraq invasion was conducted. The Army now argues that racing from city to city, with relatively little concern for security, is a mistake.” (43-44)

In translation: the military has learned critical lessons about stability operations that it has failed to follow since 2003. Now, Secretary Rumsfeld and his general staff feel they can reverse a perilous course toward civil war by now adhering to that doctrine. John McCain, during today’s Armed Service Committee hearing, in asking Generals Pace and Abizaid whether a year ago they thought a civil war was brewing in Iraq, was asking why they had not been adhering to this doctrine all along. Senator McCain essentially revealed the greatest flaw of warfare of which this Administration is guilty, and has been for at least a year: having no plan.

(“Hard-Learned Lessons: The Army is Rethinking How to Fight the Next War—and Win the Current One,” U.S. News & World Report. March 27, 2006: Volume 140, Number 11. 42-46. www.usnews.com),