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Fight Bad Policy

Dedicated to steering our nation back to its Constitutional glory by identifying and attacking bad policy.

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Location: Lake Charles, Louisiana, United States

I graduated from Drew University with an MFA in Poetry and from McNeese State University with an MA in English Literature. I also have a Bachelor of General Studies with a minor in Psychology and a BA in Sociology from McNeese. Currently, I'm working on a doctorate in English with a concentration in composition-rhetoric at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.

Wednesday, January 24, 2007

Letter to Sen. Barack Obama

Senator Obama:

You are one of America’s greats and I believe you will be President of the United States even if it is not in 4 or 8 years. Also, I believe there is a Democratic Congressional majority because of your contribution. That majority is already doing wonderfully for us concerning domestic affairs, but its unwillingness to sustain the fight against our enemies concerns me. There are more American lives at stake regarding Iraq than just the soldier’s or Marine’s. I write you because I feel that all of us have a vested interest in keeping Iraq from becoming another terrorist forward operating base. Many of us understand the cliché, “you can’t have your cake and eat it, too,” but the cliché has significance when it comes to Iraq policy. We cannot talk of a withdrawal of any kind and honestly believe that Iraqis will be able to keep regional powers from interfering more than they are already, or that they will be able to quell terrorism or sectarian violence once we have gone. We have to establish order to allow Iraqis to build and broaden stabilizing organizations, which organizations can then help themselves and their own people. As of now, though, the democratically elected Iraqi government exists only because our forces keep a modicum of order or, rather, keep chaos from bringing that government to its knees. Once we withdraw, we should expect overwhelming chaos to ensue. It is a possibility that is more real than Iraqis defending themselves from increasing violence that will touch everyone in the region and in the United States. It is important for our leaders to understand that protecting us, U.S. citizens, is a priority transcending all political ambition.

Thursday, January 18, 2007

Reply to DNC representative

Thank you for the time and patience you have reserved for my suggestions. As a concerned American, I also appreciate your response. I would like to add to the debate that while public opinion opposes a force increase in Iraq, the Democratic Party must realize that sometimes decisions that our government representatives must make to ensure national security and public safety are not always aligned with public opinion. At such times public opinion can be the public's worst enemy. So far the Democratic Congress is doing wonderfully with domestic affairs, but its fetish with public opinion is clouding its judgment regarding Iraq and will consign us and Iraq to defeat if it persists in its fetish. Again, thank you for your time and patience. I pray Democratic Party members resolve to do right by the American people.

Monday, January 15, 2007

The President's "Way Forward in Iraq" plan

The New Way Forward in Iraq

The President's New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:

1. Let the Iraqis lead;
2. Help Iraqis protect the population;
3. Isolate extremists;
4. Create space for political progress;
5. Diversify political and economic efforts; and
6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.

* Iraq Could Not Be Graver – The War On Terror Cannot Be Won If We Fail In Iraq. Our enemies throughout the Middle East are trying to defeat us in Iraq. If we step back now, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier battle than we are seeing today.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security

Iraqi:

* Publicly acknowledge all parties are responsible for quelling sectarian violence.
* Work with additional Coalition help to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi population.
* Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference.
* Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
* Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.

Coalition:

* Agree that helping Iraqis to provide population security is necessary to enable accelerated transition and political progress.
* Provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this mission.
* Increase efforts to support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar.
* Accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

* Continue counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations.
* Take more vigorous action against death squad networks.
* Accelerate transition to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.
* Increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions.
o Establish a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force.
o Reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political

Iraqi:

* The Government of Iraq commits to:
o Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
o Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law, de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
o Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.

* All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
* Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity government.

Coalition:

* Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
o Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds.
* Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead.
* Diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
o Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
o Focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

* Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities.
* Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
* Build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations.
* Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq's communities on an impartial basis.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Economic

Iraqi:

* Deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities.
* Enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation.
* Capitalize and execute jobs-producing programs.
* Match U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer term sustainable Iraqi programs.
* Focus more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth.

Coalition:

* Refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas vital to success of the government (e.g. budget execution, key ministries).
* Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone.
o Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone.
o Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

* Greater integration of economic strategy with military effort.
o Joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT.
o Remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional

Iraqi:

* Vigorously engage Arab states.
* Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood.
* Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
* Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party).

Coalition:

* Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.
* Increase military presence in the region.
* Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
* Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
* Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
* Continue to seek the region's full support in the War on Terror.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

* Focus on the International Compact.
* Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Quieting doubts about no alternative

The opposition should present a better plan if it firmly believes the President’s efforts are futile. However, the opposition has a strong point in saying that this administration has no alternative plan if the “surge” fails. While I do not believe that is true, the President might consider strengthening his position by outlining what he can as an alternative or by presenting the opposition’s plan of redeploying into Kuwait and Qatar to prevent the civil war from spilling over into other countries in the region. Even if that is not an option, presenting it as such will dull the opposition’s edge. We obviously cannot re-fight the Iraq war if we withdraw forces, but saying something to quiet doubts is better than saying nothing at all.

Thursday, January 11, 2007

The new Congress is bad for national security

It is hard to understand how most of the directors in the Intelligence Community (IC), including John Negroponte, sat before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today, testified that both immediate withdrawal and failure to secure Iraq will lead to a regional conflagration with international consequences, and members of Congress still oppose the President's current Iraq policy. They don't just oppose the policy but openly disdain it without presenting alternatives besides withdrawal. The IC believes we cannot afford to give up in Iraq. Others, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor for Pres. Carter's administration, think that if we must stay in Iraq to prevent its downfall, we will never be able to withdraw. He overlooks Pres. Bush's having said that success depends on Iraqis; consequently, if Iraqis fully embrace thier roles, the U.S. can withdraw without precipitating the worst. If nothing else, Congress has shown its willingness to act against the American Public Interest concerning Iraq, the way the Bush Administration once did, despite all the intelligence pointing to their faulty thinking.

Tuesday, January 09, 2007

Iraq needs more force than the proposed 20,000

Senator McCain:

Gen. Tommy Franks, one time CENTCOM commander, suggested to Donald Rumsfeld in preparing for the Iraq War that 400,000 troops were needed to overthrow Saddam Hussein and to successfully occupy Iraq. Franks based the number on the fact that Iraq is a country of 22 million people and is the size of California. Baghdad alone has over 6 million people. Rumsfeld constantly prodded Franks to reduce the proposed force strength until Franks suggested that a minimum of 250,000 could do the job of 400,000. We ultimately toppled Saddam and occupied Iraq with far less than 200,000, but the occupation has not been successful. Approaching a fourth year, President Bush has kept force strength at ineffective lows and now proposes to “surge” an amount of troops that is still below Franks’ minimum 250,000 needed to succeed. At a current level of 120,000, a surge of 20,000 more will leave us over 100,000 troops short of Franks’ minimum. The United States was in Afghanistan for over a year when he and Rumsfeld argued over needed force strength for Iraq, and Rumsfeld never complained that Franks had to reduce his projected numbers because two wars would overly burden our military. Instead, Rumsfeld wanted to fight both Afghanistan and Iraq with “transformed” numbers. An “over burdened military” was not a concern then and leads one to think that it, as an argument, is not grounded in fact now, but is an excuse to not succeed—a way out of Iraq. It is probably wise to reconsider Franks’ assessment to Rumsfeld over four years ago, and to consider sending 50,000-80,000 more troops instead of the proposed 20,000.

Sunday, January 07, 2007

In response to solicitation for monetary support

Gov. Howard Dean:

I cannot in good conscience help the Democratic Party while it is unwilling to pursue what is in the U.S. public interest. Our forces in Iraq cannot withdraw or redeploy without consequences in the region that could threaten American lives. A force increase, while it is unpopular, is a desperately needed positive move forward to prevent the illicit international support and exportation of terrorism that could directly threaten U.S. peace and stability. The burden of proof rests with those who say that international terrorism will not haunt the American people if our troops withdraw or redeploy. Therefore, until the Democratic Party is willing to support a sustained force increase that can actually "clear, hold, and build" throughout Iraq, creating a secure environment that is able to accommodate stabilizing organizations, I cannot and will not pledge my help.

Friday, January 05, 2007

Revisiting the Iraq problem

A surge into Iraq of a mere 20,000 troops has little hope of maintaining the requisite peace for stabilizing organizations to exist there. On the other hand, there is little U.S. public support for troop increases in Iraq. If only a significant force increase in Iraq means the successful rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure and security, and a lack of U.S. public support for significant force increases prevents our government from actually and substantially boosting force strength in Iraq, then it is a lack of U.S. public support that prevents a successful rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure and security. However, that rebuilding is in the U.S. public interest—preventing the illicit international support and exportation of terrorism that could directly threaten U.S. peace and stability. Consequently, there is a serious detachment between public sentiment and reality that has to be reconciled to prevent international terrorism from threatening U.S. peace and stability. Some have said that the Iraq problem is political and not military, but a political problem is a military problem as warfare extends from and generally enables politics when politics reaches impasse. The political problem lies in politicians’ inability to act in the best public interest even when that interest contradicts public sentiment. If Congress supports a public sentiment that goes against public interest, it obviously acts contrarily to public interest.

Arguable is the premise that the U.S. must succeed in Iraq to prevent the threat of illicit international support and exportation of terrorism. While some can claim that the premise does not reflect reality, its potential is real. Hence, the possibility is real that failure in Iraq could enable terrorism to reach out against the United States and its interests. Imprudent is allowing that possibility to become reality by letting the U.S. fail in Iraq. If we must increase force strength by an exorbitant amount for years into the future, such is necessary to keep safe and secure the United States and its interests. No longer can a person claim that initially going into an Iraq war was a mistake, therefore currently fighting in Iraq is a mistake. The “Pottery Barn” doctrine (if you break the thing, you are responsible for its replacement) has always been untrue because the U.S. can wage a just war and thoroughly neglect rebuilding the battlefield. Still, in Iraq, neglecting real efforts to rebuild the battlefield is tantamount to the U.S. inviting regional instability that can directly affect the U.S. and its interests. Since that possibility is real, the burden of proof rests with opponents that claim such a thing cannot or will not happen; therefore, we should not increase force strength but should withdraw or in other ways “redeploy.”
It is true that entering into war with Iraq has increased the chances of terrorism revisiting the United States. However, the U.S. has an obligation to prevent that imminent threat. It cannot do so by withdrawing any time soon or without increasing force strength by a large amount.

Tuesday, January 02, 2007

Worst case

On Oct. 2, 2002 and lasting for 23 days, two men committed some of America’s most heinous murders. After sixteen dead, police finally captured John Allen “Muhammad” Williams and Lee Boyd Malvo. For 23 days the two selected random targets, and from the cover of the trunk of a 1990 Chevrolet Caprice Malvo fired a high-powered rifle while Williams sat behind the steering wheel. Importantly, until their capture, the rampage left U.S. citizens terrified prompting the distinction between murderer and terrorist. While terrorists are murderers, murderers are not necessarily terrorists. However, when a murderer selects random targets to terrorize the citizenry and to halt infrastructure, the murderer is a terrorist.

While it is difficult to say that Williams and Malvo were anything but murderers, the way they operated—shoot, move, and hide—could have even more terrifying consequences if a well funded, highly organized, highly motivated, well trained, and patient terrorist organization infiltrated the United States and used similar operating tactics. A foreign terrorist group could deploy illegals through the vast unprotected U.S.-Canada border. Only 288 people in three two-man hit teams in forty-eight states could be enough to seriously terrorize U.S. citizens and to halt infrastructure. If each team accomplished what Williams and Malvo did in the same amount of time, over 2300 Americans would die in 23 days. While not having the same psychological impact as a 9/11/01, the impact would be, in some ways, even more devious since the terror would continue more like an invasion that sustains insecurity and uncertainty. Such a group would be able to rotate teams into or out of the country before or after law enforcement captured a team. Also, the longer the terrorism succeeded, the likelier the chance of emplaced teams becoming sleepers waiting for activation to perpetrate mass annihilation.

Hopefully nothing like this nightmare scenario will ever occur, but these are scary times. We must be cognizant of our immigration problems and our ability to act responsibly, rapidly, and effectively to threats. For these reasons it is important to review and to put into proper perspective the cold-blooded murders by Williams and Malvo in Oct., 2002.