Revisiting the Iraq problem

A surge into Iraq of a mere 20,000 troops has little hope of maintaining the requisite peace for stabilizing organizations to exist there. On the other hand, there is little U.S. public support for troop increases in Iraq. If only a significant force increase in Iraq means the successful rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure and security, and a lack of U.S. public support for significant force increases prevents our government from actually and substantially boosting force strength in Iraq, then it is a lack of U.S. public support that prevents a successful rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure and security. However, that rebuilding is in the U.S. public interest—preventing the illicit international support and exportation of terrorism that could directly threaten U.S. peace and stability. Consequently, there is a serious detachment between public sentiment and reality that has to be reconciled to prevent international terrorism from threatening U.S. peace and stability. Some have said that the Iraq problem is political and not military, but a political problem is a military problem as warfare extends from and generally enables politics when politics reaches impasse. The political problem lies in politicians’ inability to act in the best public interest even when that interest contradicts public sentiment. If Congress supports a public sentiment that goes against public interest, it obviously acts contrarily to public interest.

Arguable is the premise that the U.S. must succeed in Iraq to prevent the threat of illicit international support and exportation of terrorism. While some can claim that the premise does not reflect reality, its potential is real. Hence, the possibility is real that failure in Iraq could enable terrorism to reach out against the United States and its interests. Imprudent is allowing that possibility to become reality by letting the U.S. fail in Iraq. If we must increase force strength by an exorbitant amount for years into the future, such is necessary to keep safe and secure the United States and its interests. No longer can a person claim that initially going into an Iraq war was a mistake, therefore currently fighting in Iraq is a mistake. The “Pottery Barn” doctrine (if you break the thing, you are responsible for its replacement) has always been untrue because the U.S. can wage a just war and thoroughly neglect rebuilding the battlefield. Still, in Iraq, neglecting real efforts to rebuild the battlefield is tantamount to the U.S. inviting regional instability that can directly affect the U.S. and its interests. Since that possibility is real, the burden of proof rests with opponents that claim such a thing cannot or will not happen; therefore, we should not increase force strength but should withdraw or in other ways “redeploy.”
It is true that entering into war with Iraq has increased the chances of terrorism revisiting the United States. However, the U.S. has an obligation to prevent that imminent threat. It cannot do so by withdrawing any time soon or without increasing force strength by a large amount.